

Solidarity and Fragmentation in the Human Rights Community: An Introduction to *Human Rights Review*

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Human Rights Review appears in the last year of a century that has witnessed the birth of the age of human rights. Many ventures being launched at century's end (to say nothing of one launched at the end of a millennium) are cloaked in a rhetoric of utopianism and optimism. It is tempting to announce the publication of *Human Rights Review* in the same vein. In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Declaration articulates fundamental, universal human rights that transcend the vicissitudes of local cultures. There is every reason to believe that the globalization of human rights and norms and international standards that began so intensely in mid-century will intensify in the next century, perhaps to an as yet unimaginable degree.

The march of abstract ideas involving human rights has been accompanied by the emergence of a vast number of non-governmental organizations which aim to protect the rights of the powerless from abuse by the powerful and to seek justice for those who violate human rights. Taken as a whole, these organizations represent a fundamental challenge to the time-honored idea of state sovereignty. Once-mighty leaders like Chile's Augusto Pinochet have been brought to their knees by those whom Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink refer to as "activists beyond borders."¹ At the beginning of the twentieth century, and even more so during the dark days of World War II, it would have been difficult to predict that the concern for universal human rights would have been so pronounced by century's end. Yet much has been achieved, and there is good reason to be optimistic about the next century. One might even imagine, if only wistfully, that the discourse of universal human rights might be the *zeitgeist* of the next millennium.

Yet, any optimism we might have about progress in the area of human rights must immediately be tempered by a recognition that there is a wide discrepancy between ideals and reality in regard to human rights. As Norberto Bobbio cautions us:

I would advise anyone who wishes to carry out an unbiased examination of the development of human rights after the Second World War to carry out this sobering exercise: to read the Universal Declaration and look around. Such a person would be obliged to recognize that in spite of the enlightened advances of philosophers, the bold formulations of lawyers and the efforts of well-intentioned politicians, there is still a long way to go.²

Any discussion of human rights must be grounded in a conscious recognition of the enduring human problems of violence, cruelty, and the assaults on human dignity which have defined the twentieth century and which are likely to persist into the next. Behind the lofty discourse of human rights and the phalanges of institutions meant to protect human rights lies a stream of history that grates at the very core of the idea of universal human rights. R.J. Rummel, the able chronicler of the grim statistics of the dark side of the twentieth century, has estimated that 170 million people have been killed by states in this century.³ The United Nations Declaration of Universal Human Rights was meant to redirect the course of history away from such unmitigated violence, but the death tolls since World War II do not offer any evidence that the spirit of the Declaration has been achieved in practice. Indeed, Rummel estimates that 76 million people have been murdered by states since the end of the war.⁴ Things appear to have changed little.

The communist excesses of Mao Zedong, Pol Pot, and Fidel Castro, the post-colonial violence in the new states that emerged from the ashes of European empires, genocide and ethnic cleansing in Rwanda and Bosnia (the latter in the heart of Europe, the very cradle of the idea of universal human rights), state-sponsored killing in Viet Nam, Argentina, Guatemala, Iraq, Chechnya, and Kosovo remind us that the history of human rights in this century can never be written purely in terms of the universalist dreams for a world order based on fundamental respect for individual, social, political, and economic rights. Given this history, any announcement of a new journal in human rights that were to cloak itself in purely positive and utopian elocutions should be immediately suspect.

In recognition of the strides that have been made in the advancement of global discourse on human rights, *Human Rights Review* launches itself with a spirit of optimism, yet one that is tempered by a stoic recognition that our highest dreams for universal human rights are unmatched by empirical realities. Such stoicism does not mean that the tone of *Human Rights Review* is to be negative and pessimistic. In spite of history—literally—and against the tide of violence that seems to define our age as much as any concern for human rights, the century has also given birth to a vibrant and growing human rights community that, despite differences and conflicts within it, remains steadfastly committed to safeguarding and enhancing human rights on a massive scale. The nation-state, long the sacred organizing principle of world order, now coexists with and is threatened by a plethora of human rights activists, scholars, lawyers, and or-

ganizations that are determined to privilege universal rights over and against the brutality of states, ideologues, generals, and dictators.⁵

The actors who constitute the human rights community, both individual and institutional, speak in a variety of voices, sometimes in terms so different that they cannot understand each other. The physician who devotes his entire attention to providing documentary physical evidence of torture, the lawyer who seeks adequate legal grounds for prosecuting the torturer, the scholar who seeks to understand why the torturer tortures, and the local activist who devotes her leisure time to the task of trying to help stop the suffering that she sees broadcast on her television every day all have a very different way of approaching the problem of human rights. Yet, in spite of such differences, those who work in the various areas of human rights are united by one idea: they recognize that human beings are frail creatures who are subject to personal and institutional forces and powers beyond their control and who are in need of protection. This recognition of the frailty of the human body is, as Cambridge sociologist Bryan S. Turner points out, one discernible cultural universal in a world of cultural differences and disagreements.⁶ All human beings, notes Turner, are conscious of the idea that other human beings are vulnerable, easily damaged, destined to become weak, and to die. All cultures respond differently to this recognition of human frailty through the development of different institutional means meant to deal with it. Most cultures offer means for the alleviation of this frailty. Yet, at the same time, there are people who seek to take advantage of and exploit human frailty, to build their own power and serve their own interests at the expense of the weak.

At the most fundamental level, those who work in the field of human rights seek to counter those actors—whether individual or institutional—who exploit the frail human body. In spite of their disparateness, they are united by their consciousness of the frailty of human beings, and each, in his or her own way, does what he or she can to alleviate this frailty. This shared recognition of human frailty and the perception of the need to protect the weak constitutes the *ethos* of the human rights community. It is this ethos that is the basis for the solidarity of the human rights community, which faces a panoply of cultural, linguistic, national, generational, ethnic, racial, and class differences that are always potentially and actually at work to divide it. The ethos of the human rights community makes it possible for all those involved in the study and practice of human rights, in spite of quite pronounced differences, to imagine themselves as part of a global community that transcends traditional demarcations of state and citizenship. In some senses, as Michael Perry suggests, the ethos of the human rights community is “inescapably religious,” based on “the conviction that every individual is sacred—that every human being is inviolable, has an inherent dignity, is an end in himself.”⁷

Human Rights Review is devoted to no particular language, voice, ideological position, or epistemological standpoint within the human rights commu-

nity. Rather, it is devoted to providing space for the articulation of a variety of critical standpoints within that community. It will be concerned with understanding more deeply, and from a variety of perspectives, the sources and motivations that lie behind different positions in the human rights community, as well as the causes, extent, and consequences of human rights violations. It will foster discussion of the most difficult issues in human rights, not only the timeless ones for which there seem to be no final answers—cultural relativism versus universalism, individual and political rights versus social and economic rights, cultural imperialism versus humanitarian intervention—but also new and difficult questions that seem to arise at every moment in the contemporary world.

In almost every major political event in the modern world, whether it be the fighting of a war or the forging of cooperative economic relations between states, the discourse of human rights lies just beneath the surface. Discussions about economic relations with China, for instance, are inextricably linked to the discourse of human rights and the long legacy of abuse of individual and political rights in that country. As the first issue of *Human Rights Review* was being assembled, a war was waged against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the constituent forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). One of the most common explanations for the war has been that it is an expression of the global hegemony of the United States and other Western powers in the face of the dissolution of communism. Lurking behind this Machiavellian idea, which is the staple not only of historical actors involved in the conflict (especially those within Serbia), but the theorists who study them, is the discourse on human rights. This discourse was invoked as a rationale for the NATO campaign against the autocratic leader and indicted war criminal, Slobodan Milosevic, who, in addition to waging war and fostering genocide in the newly independent states of the former Yugoslavia throughout the entire decade of the 1990s, forced over one million Yugoslav citizens to flee from their own country purely because of their ethnicity as Albanians. Many of these refugees were stripped of their identities and forcibly removed in railway cars, evoking scenes of Europe during the Second World War. Czech President Vaclav Havel has written recently that we may be entering an age when fundamental human rights trump state sovereignty. In a world of widely diffused mass media images of violence, states can no longer hide behind the idea of sovereignty.⁸ Transnational actors, united around the ethos of the human rights community, are fueled by the images of destruction which motivate them to resist, each in his or her own way, the exploitation of the weak by the strong.

Yet all of this concern with human rights comes with significant disagreement and anxiety. There is no longer a left-right consensus on the appropriate course of action to be taken in relation to widespread human rights abuses. Can power, which is so often the target of those who work in the human rights community because they know what power is capable of, be used to enforce the sacred norms

of the human rights community? To put it more bluntly, and to turn Mao Zedong on his head, can human rights come out of the barrel of a gun? Or, as the doyens of the left have recently argued in a special issue of *New Left Review*, does this supposed new concern with universal human rights simply represent a new stage of Western imperialism cloaked in the rhetoric of human rights?⁹ *Human Rights Review* will provide a forum for examining such difficult questions in the field of human rights. In the second issue of the first volume, the war in Kosovo and its human rights dimensions will be the subject of a special symposium featuring some of the most prominent world-wide experts on Balkan affairs.

The task of providing an authentically pluralist forum for the human rights community is, at the outset, confounded by a number of problems. These problems emanate from the ideological fault lines that run through the human rights community. The solidarity of the human rights community is, like the bodies it aims to protect, itself tenuous and frail. Different conceptions of human rights have caused deep schisms within the community. Should the focus be on protecting individual rights and liberties such as freedom of speech and trade? Or should human rights begin with the idea that all individual rights devolve from and depend on ensuring social and economic rights? These ideological divisions over fundamental issues in human rights were deeply encoded in the concrete political struggles of the Cold War and, in spite of the ratification of the Declaration of Universal Human Rights, have worked against the formation of consensus in the human rights community. They have led to a certain degree of defensive posturing and name-calling as well, with advocates of individual rights being labeled as "conservatives" or "bourgeois" by left-wing critics, and advocates of social and economic rights labeled as "radical" or "communist" by right-wing critics. Such divisions ignore the basic fact that the question of individual versus social rights is essentially one to which there is no clear answer. Any answer that is offered must acknowledge the complex dialectical interplay between individual and social rights in the modern world.

The most serious practical result of the ideological schisms and fragmentation in the human rights community is that those very forces that commit human rights violations are strengthened. Violators of human rights care little about where those rights come from or which of them are antecedent to or more important than others and they certainly take much succor in the spectacle of members of the human rights community squabbling amongst themselves. The protracted battles within the human rights community, especially those of an ideological nature, have weakened the very power of that community to counter human rights violations, whether these be violations of individual or social rights. This does not mean that the human rights community has to agree, even on basic and fundamental issues. What it does mean is that such disagreement and difference ought to take place with a willful and constant attention to the common ethos which the members of the human rights

community share in spite of their disagreements and differences with one another.

Human Rights Review will be devoted to providing an open forum for examining ideological schisms and conflicts within the human rights community. The operating principle will be the same reflexive one that guides the practice of good social science: before one studies the other, one should study the self. The global human rights community consists of a huge number of institutions and organizations, each of which has its own set of interests and goals. Criticism of such interests is often met with defensiveness, a kind of circling of the wagons that is meant to protect organizations and the actors within them rather than the vulnerable people which such organizations are meant to serve.¹⁰ In his masterpiece, *Ideology and Utopia*, the eminent sociologist of knowledge Karl Mannheim noted, with great prescience, the ways in which utopian thought in the twentieth century was threatened by ideologies that protect group interests. Noting that utopian thinking was always destined to struggle against a "complacent tendency to accept the present," Mannheim lamented the seeming insurmountability of oppression and domination in relation to the realization of social progress: "We could change the whole of society tomorrow if everybody could agree. The real obstacle is that every individual is bound into a system of established relationships which to a large extent hamper his will."¹¹

There is certainly no better example of utopian thinking than the idea of universal human rights. It has displaced some of the more disastrous schemes of the twentieth century as the central mode of utopian thinking in the world today. Members of the human rights community display an indomitable will to aid the weak and to seek justice for those who would exploit them. Yet, one wonders how much established institutional relationships which favor the pursuit of individual and organizational interests stand in the way of the realization of the utopian goal of universal human rights. The dreams of universal human rights are almost naively pure, but the world in which such dreams exist is not. Dreamers can become ideologists and this is no less the case in the human rights community than it is in other social groups. As a result, *Human Rights Review* will be devoted to the development of a self-critical perspective which makes the human rights community itself a serious object of analysis.

In this spirit, we present in Volume One, Number One, a symposium on a most difficult and divisive issue within the human rights community: the case of Rigoberta Menchú. There are sacred orthodoxies and pieties in all communities which give them shape and purpose, and the human rights community is no exception. As noted above, there is a religious sensibility in the human rights community and, just as in formal religions, the human rights community has its icons. Rigoberta Menchú, the Mayan human rights activist who won a Nobel Prize for her efforts to combat state terror in Guatemala, is one of those icons. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Menchú became a cult figure in

the human rights community, a veritable icon of resistance to the very kind of brutal state power that defines the century. Her book, *I, Rigoberta Menchú: An Indian Woman in Guatemala*, was taught as “the truth” about the nature of human rights abuses in Central America and created whole cadres of human rights activists.¹² However, in a recent book by anthropologist David Stoll entitled *Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans*, the author alleged that key elements of Menchú’s story were fabricated.¹³ While the events she described were essentially accurate—the Guatemalan military did wage a genocidal war against the indigenous population in the country—the truth of key elements of her own story, including the nature of her political affiliations, her education, and her family history, was called into question based on Stoll’s own extensive research in Guatemala.

Stoll’s account and the response to it has created deep divisions within the human rights community. Many have argued that the case demonstrates the lack of critical capacity in the human rights community, a sense that it is more of a religious community than an intellectual one committed to some verifiable and rational standard of truth. Others have argued that the case demonstrates that there are no clear cut lines between “good guys” and “bad guys” in political struggles and that those who work in the human rights community need to be more cognizant of this fact. In contrast, others have defended Menchú on the grounds that the literary tradition of *testimonio*, which her work represents, allows for the individual to speak in the name of the collective so that historical particulars are less important than the collective truth of a whole people’s experience. Still others have claimed that Menchú’s critics are part of a widespread right wing conspiracy by hegemonic white males to demean an empowered woman of color.¹⁴

Whatever one’s position in this debate, the issue is important because it shows how internecine ideological debates and disagreements can pull like-minded people away from the recognition of more fundamental issues upon which they agree. None of the “combatants” in the “Menchú wars” would argue in defense of the actions of the Guatemalan military, except, perhaps those very members of the military who are not unhappy to see the “enemy” discredited. But most members of the human rights community would agree on the fundamental principle that the indigenous population was vulnerable and in need of protection. In spite of this, though, the case has led to a fragmentation within the human rights community rather than to the building of solidarity within that community in the face of real dangers and threats to human rights that continue unabated in the world today. A biblical quote is in order: “A man’s enemies will be those of his own household” (Matthew 10:36).

In this inaugural issue of *Human Rights Review*, we offer a symposium on the Menchú affair which features essays by a number of leading scholars from different disciplines. There were no specific guidelines or directives given for the reviews: authors were asked to write on the issues which they, as experts

in their fields, felt were important. *Human Rights Review* offers the symposium not with the intent to compel readers to choose sides or to vilify one party or the other, but to underscore the important intellectual and moral issues that the controversy engenders. This initiates a formal model for future symposia, each of which will foster the free, open, and rational expression of thoughts on enduring and controversial issues in the field of human rights.

Human Rights Review is dedicated to publishing articles that represent the diversity of languages that constitute the global human rights community. Publication of articles on a wide range of topics and representing a diversity of perspectives is not meant to eradicate conflicts in the community. On the contrary, it is meant to offer a forum in which the many voices in the human rights community can be heard. The aim of *Human Rights Review* is to offer a forum for challenges and critiques of all different perspectives in the belief that challenge and critique advance knowledge. If there is any guiding principle, it is that one's own side—whatever side that might be—must be held to the highest standard. This was the guiding principle of the lifework of George Orwell, who, despite his failings in many areas, never ceased to scrutinize his own positions as a means of strengthening them. Within the human rights community, there are a number of orthodoxies that are not often challenged. While it is every author's right to reproduce orthodoxies if he or she believes them to be the truth, *Human Rights Review* will not lend itself to the reproduction of orthodoxies, but will serve to challenge them.

As an example of such orthodoxy in the human rights community, let us take the example of Cuba. While it is certainly the case that leading international human rights organizations have offered much compelling evidence for continued human rights abuses under the Castro regime, this documentation effort has not been pursued with an equal measure of pressure by non-governmental organizations to seek justice for Castro's violations of human rights.¹⁵ There are a number of reasons why this might be the case. The most obvious is that the United States has exerted immense pressure on the Castro regime throughout its entire existence through various means, ranging from the attempted political assassination of Castro himself to the imposition of severe trade embargoes against Cuba. Activists have focused their energies on the pursuit of justice for other dictators whom the United States ignores and to whom the United States has actually given support.

Another reason for downplaying Castro's human rights violations has to do with the emphasis on social and economic rights in the human rights community. Since Castro is a protector of these rights over and against individual and civil rights, it is not surprising that he has received much support from members of the human rights community. This support is enhanced by Castro's heartfelt and authentic critique of those regimes, sometimes aided and abetted by the United States, that abuse human rights in Latin America and his support for indigenous revolutionary movements in the region. There is a long

tradition of support for Castro among the American left and, as Paul Hollander has pointed out, his supporters were highly uncritical of Castro's human rights abuses.¹⁶

In regard to scholarship on human rights in Latin America, it is interesting to note that in the twenty-year index for the leading journal in the field of human rights, *Human Rights Quarterly*, there are many articles on the excesses of Latin American regimes over the last two decades. In fact, in this periodical, there were thirty-four articles on specific human rights issues in Latin America, but *not one* article on Cuba.¹⁷ Since the content of refereed journals tends to be the best dipstick with which to measure trends in the field, it is safe to say that there has been a willful neglect in the human rights community of the issue of human rights in Cuba. Consider a case that reflects this selective attention to human rights violations: a Spanish judge, much to the great acclaim of human rights workers around the world, has initiated extradition proceedings against retired general Augusto Pinochet. Pinochet, who was responsible for massive human rights violations in Chile, but who was granted amnesty within his own country because he turned over power to a civil government, is being detained in England while a decision is being made. The initiation of these procedures in Spain coincided with an official state visit by Fidel Castro to Spain to solidify a new diplomatic initiative with that country. Except for the Cuban dissident community, Castro's visit was barely noted and he returned safely to Cuba, where he proceeded to crack down on dissidents and initiatives to liberalize Cuban society by fostering closer ties with the United States.¹⁸

The point of the above comparison is not to decide which atrocities and crimes against humanity are worse or which are more worthy of our attention. Nor is it to take a "liberal" or a "conservative" position in relation to human rights violations.¹⁹ *Human Rights Review* will adhere to the injunction that it is an abomination to compare abominations in any moral sense, to decide whether some kinds of killing are worse than others. Supposedly—as legal scholars keep reminding us—when we are talking about human rights violations, numbers are not supposed to matter. It may be the case that Pinochet is responsible for more death and destruction than Castro. Yet, to the victim of human rights abuses, it matters little how many others suffered like he or she did. Neither is the purpose of the comparison between Pinochet and Castro meant to demand that those who intervene in one case must necessarily intervene in all cases. Rather, the point is to show that there is a willful silence about some classes of human rights abuses, a silence that is indicative of an ideologically based preference to examine some human rights abuses and to ignore others. If there is any hope for universal human rights, such double standards cannot be tolerated. Finally, the comparison between Pinochet and Castro also serves to underscore the fact that human rights is not a left versus right issue. It is not only right wing regimes that violate human rights. Human rights abuses are not confined to this or that side of the political spectrum. Indeed, the most spec-

tacular abuses since World War II have occurred at the hands of left-wing regimes such as those of Mao Zedong and Pol Pot. Atrocity is not the exclusive property of either the right or the left. A human rights abuse is a human rights abuse and the victim cares little about the ideological motivations of his or her abuser.

Thus, a central task of *Human Rights Review* is to offer critical perspectives on human rights abuses, whatever their ideological sources or motivations. If one truly believes in the primacy of social and economic rights, if one authentically supports leaders that fight against capitalist oppression, it does not follow that one needs to turn a blind eye to those who commit human rights abuses in the name of those beliefs or struggles. *Human Rights Review* will be dedicated to fostering self-critical and iconoclastic views in the belief that such modes of thinking are important means for the advancement of knowledge.

Finally, a fundamental goal of *Human Rights Review* is to bring together two realms of knowledge that are too often seen as incommensurate: the discourse of social science and the discourse on human rights. How can social science, which depends fundamentally on an ethos of relativism and ethical neutrality, be squared with the ethos of the human rights community, which demands engagement and involvement? Indeed, the very idea of universal human values grates at the idea, dominant in social science, of the constructed and contextual nature of values. Many social scientists, committed as they are to value freedom and objectivity in their craft, forget that the injunction to value freedom only governs the practice of their craft, not their whole existence as human beings. The social sciences have long been melioristic, aimed at gaining knowledge for the alleviation of a host of social ills. Yet, the application of social science theories and methods to problems in human rights is not well developed, especially in the case of the study of individual and political rights. Even in the formal study of international relations, the one area where one would expect the study of human rights to be central, the study of human rights is marginal, at best a prosaic Kantian holdover in a field dominated by the ghost of Machiavelli.

The tense relationship between social science and human rights is explored by anthropologist Cynthia Mahmood in the lead essay in this first issue of *Human Rights Review*. Mahmood outlines with great passion and sensitivity the difficulty of uniting the perspective of the human rights activist and the perspective of the social sciences. Her essay is instrumental in demonstrating the power of the ethos of the human rights community and in showing that one can, and indeed must, be sensitive to the humanity that one encounters in the process of doing sophisticated, empirical research. *Human Rights Review* does not aspire to solve the thorny problem of incommensurability among different modes of knowledge and different perspectives within the human rights community. It does aim, though, to provide a "safe area" where the relations among different modalities and realms of knowledge can be explored.

The interdisciplinary nature of *Human Rights Review* is perhaps best illustrated by its sterling editorial board. Above all, *Human Rights Review* aims to be deeply interdisciplinary and the constitution of the editorial board reflects this goal. It consists of philosophers, political scientists, theologians, anthropologists, sociologists, practicing lawyers and legal philosophers, physicians, activists, and political leaders who have played special roles in the defense of human rights. The prospects for the success of a journal are perhaps best measured by the serendipity that surrounds its foundation. And perhaps the most serendipitous aspect of founding of *Human Rights Review* is that nearly all the people invited to be on the editorial board—and this includes some of the most prominent scholars in their fields from around the world—accepted the invitation and offered positive encouragement for *Human Rights Review*. I cannot know for sure what the motivations of my newfound colleagues are for joining the board, but I thank them and take their support as a sign that there is strong interest across the wide range of disciplinary perspectives in moving the study and practice of human rights in new directions. Any publication is only as good as its editorial board.

Readers of *Human Rights Review* are invited to respond to articles that appear in its pages. They are invited to submit articles with the full knowledge that the editor is committed to the principle, put forth with great eloquence by the eminent philosopher of science, Paul Feyerabend, of “epistemological anarchism.” This idea holds that the surest way to advance knowledge is to allow for the greatest diversity of approaches and perspectives, to let a thousand flowers bloom. It is hoped that *Human Rights Review* will become known as the place where the presentation of provocative ideas will advance the cause of universal human rights. In each issue, we will feature letters in response to articles from previous issues with the hope of maintaining threads of debate from issue to issue. Finally, in the humble belief that the editor cannot possibly know the richness and variety of all of the topics that concern members of the human rights community, all members of that community are invited to submit ideas for special issues, guest edited issues, book reviews, and anything else they feel to be relevant to the conduct and progress of *Human Rights Review*.

Notes

1. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998).
2. Norberto Bobbio, *The Age of Rights* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996), 30.
3. R.J. Rummel, *Death By Government* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994). See Chapter One for details on the derivation of this figure.
4. This statistic is cited by R.J. Rummel in a paper entitled “Democide Since World War II,” written for publication on the World Wide Web. The paper can be found at: <http://www2.hawaii.edu/~rummel/POSTWWII.HTM#>
5. See Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, for a detailed elaboration of the emergence of this community.
6. Bryan Turner, “Outline of a Theory of Human Rights,” *Sociology* 27 (1993): 489-512.

7. Michael J. Perry, *The Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 13.
8. Vaclav Havel, "Kosovo and the End of the Nation-State," *New York Review of Books* 46:10 (June 10, 1999): 4-6.
9. See the special issue of *New Left Review* entitled "The Imperialism of Human Rights," May-June, 1999.
10. A prime example of such critique can be found in two articles by Michael N. Barnett, "The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda," *Cultural Anthropology* 12:4 (1997): 551-578; and "The Politics of Indifference at the United Nations and Genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia," in Thomas Cushman and Stjepan Mestrovic, eds., *This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 128-162.
11. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1936).
12. Rigoberta Menchú, I, *Rigoberta Menchú: An Indian Woman in Guatemala*, ed. Elisabeth Burgos-Debray (London: Verso, 1984).
13. David Stoll, *Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999).
14. This claim was made, in earnest, by a presenter at a Wellesley College colloquium which I attended in the spring of 1999.
15. For documentation of these violations of human rights, see United States Congress. House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, "Human Rights Violations in Castro's Cuba: The Repression Continues" (Washington: Government Printing Office, June 27, 1996); Margaret I. Short, *Law and Religion in Marxist Cuba: A Human Rights Inquiry* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1993); Amnesty International, *Cuba, Silencing the Voices of Dissent* (New York: Amnesty International, 1992). For a comparison case of human rights violations in Chile and Cuba, see Alvaro de Arce, *Cuba y Chile. la cuestion de los derechos humanos* (Madrid: Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales, 1988).
16. See Paul Hollander, *Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba, 1928-1978* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).
17. The exact breakdown is as follows: five articles on Chile, five on El Salvador, four on Latin America in general, five on Argentina, three on Nicaragua, two on Brazil, two on the Caribbean (not including Cuba), two on Guatemala, two on the Southern Cone, and one each on Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.
18. In March, 1999, Castro jailed four prominent dissidents on charges of sedition. Cuba's trading partners protested the move, but beyond this political protest, no action was taken to release the dissidents.
19. In an editorial on the matter, Carroll Bogert of Human Rights Watch refers to critics who point out the differential treatment of Pinochet and Castro as "conservative," even though she agrees that Castro deserves justice. Such political labeling, in addition to leading to fragmentation in the human rights community, begs the question of whether there is a bias against anti-communist human rights violators in the human rights community. The question is an empirical one. See Carroll Bogert, "The Pinochet Precedent," *New York Times* (December 2, 1998): 27.