



Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy. by David R. Segal

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background information, it is critical reading for researchers on U.S. food assistance programs. In the classroom, this short case study could serve as a basis for discussion of the policy-making process.

Governing by Committee: Collegial Leadership in Advanced Societies, by THOMAS A. BAYLIS. Albany: SUNY Press, 1989. 236 pp. \$54.50 cloth. \$18.95 paper.

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Baylis defines collegial leadership as "the operation of a set of continuing political leadership structures and practices through which significant decisions are taken in common by a small, face-to-face body with no single member dominating their initiation or determination" (p. 7). Collegial leadership may be formal or institutionalized or informal and de facto. As such, it is found to varying degrees in a variety of institutional settings.

This study focuses on collegial leadership in national, political executives in contemporary advanced industrial societies. Baylis examines sixteen Western and Communist states in an attempt to show that such leadership is much more prevalent than is often assumed. He seeks to discover the determinants of collegial leadership, its consequences for governmental performance, its relationship to organizational decision making, and its contrast with monocratic leadership.

To a significant extent Baylis succeeds. He discovers a wide mixture of collegial and monocratic elements of decision making, leading him to classify countries along a monocratic-collegial continuum. He finds three key determinants: historical-cultural, institutional, and bureaucratic-neocorporatist. Perhaps most interesting for political scientists and sociologists is his conclusion that, contrary to Weber's assertions about the incompatibility of modern bureaucracy with collegial decision making, the evolution of bureaucratic/interest group interaction, particularly in the form of neocorporatism, actually encourages collegial leadership. Collegial executives behave much like other small groups in terms of size of the body, the degree of specialization in leadership functions, and

group emphasis on consensus seeking. Baylis' findings about the consequences of collegial decision making are interesting, but necessarily speculative and hence suggestive rather than conclusive. Similarly, the comparisons of collegial and monocratic leadership are interesting but empirically tentative.

The book has a few shortcomings. Country specialists will take issue with some treatments of individual countries. This criticism is inevitable because the study is cast at the macro level of entire countries. Moreover, the relationships Baylis investigates, such as the system-level consequences of collegial leadership, can only be addressed very generally. But these problems are endemic to such studies and do not detract significantly from the overall value of the research.

The most serious criticisms I have concern the sources. In some instances the review of the literature is dated. For example, the discussions of consociationalism and small-group theory suffer from this problem and they fail to address significant, recent developments. There is also evidence of some carelessness in citations. I hasten to add that I scrutinized these only after I discovered an incorrect title for my own work. (Later I was given credit for co-authoring an article which I feel certain I did not!) I subsequently found some other errors in footnotes and the bibliography.

Nonetheless, the book is well written and has a clear thesis and a logical flow to its arguments. It demonstrates the need for more attention to small-group theory in studies of decision making at nearly all levels of analysis. Baylis' direct engagement of Weber's propositions concerning modern bureaucracy and styles of political decision making should be important for a wide range of scholars, appealing to sociologists and political scientists interested in small-group theory, organizational behavior, political executives, and comparative decision-making processes. Although the book does not break new theoretical ground, it serves well to rekindle a theoretical focus on the small group even while it remains essentially a cross-national study of executive decision making. It is both a timely and thoughtful addition to the literature.

Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy, by DAVID R.

SEGAL. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989. 221 pp. \$25.00 cloth.

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This book examines recruitment policies of the United States armed forces in their changing social, political, and military context. Building on the work of Morris Janowitz and Charles Moskos, David Segal ably traces the evolution of recruitment policies and patterns and situates the current debate about national service in relation to changes in geopolitical configuration, military doctrine, welfare institutions, and conceptions of citizenship.

The first chapter shows how current American recruitment patterns and policies have been shaped by five intersecting military and sociopolitical developments: the technically and strategically conditioned eclipse of the mass citizen army; the shift from high-intensity warfare to low-intensity "constabulary" operations, exemplified most recently by the U.S. invasion of Panama; the divorce of citizenship rights (especially welfare entitlements) from citizenship obligations; the extension of citizenship rights—and the opening of the armed forces—to blacks and women; and the shrinking cohorts of potential recruits, a consequence of the "birth dearth" of the 1960s. Subsequent chapters survey the evolution of recruitment policies and patterns from the colonial period to the present; relate this evolution to the pervasive rationalization of social structure and military organization; explore the key role of benefits linked to military service in the development of the American welfare state; examine in historical perspective the halting incorporation of blacks and women in the armed forces; review plausible combat scenarios; and argue for a system of voluntary national service to strengthen U.S. reserve capacity.

The analytical and normative focus of *Recruiting for Uncle Sam* is the redefinition of soldiering from an obligation of citizenship to just another job. Increasingly, military recruitment and management techniques are like those of the civilian sector. Segal is concerned with the military and political consequences of this institutional convergence. He wonders whether an all-volunteer force that is "driven by self-interest rather

than by citizenship obligation" (p. 15) can be adequate not only in numbers and capacities but also in motivation and commitment. And he is disturbed by the more general political consequences of an atrophying sense of civic obligation. Yet while he favors establishing "normative expectations of fulfillment of citizenship obligations" (p. 175), he stops short of calling for obligatory service. Obligatory, universal military service would flood the military with unneeded recruits, while a program permitting a choice of military or civilian service would pose difficult problems of equivalence between alternative forms of service and would face constitutional challenge as a form of involuntary servitude. Concluding that "universality and compulsion are legal and political liabilities that can and should be avoided" (p. 175), Segal endorses instead a version of voluntary national service that would "celebrate the participation of those who elect to serve" yet would also "provide sufficient tangible rewards for participation to make it apparent that national service has long-term benefits to the individual as well as to the nation" (p. 176). In the end, then, he too relies on a system "driven by self-interest rather than by citizenship obligation."

The book would have benefited from comparative reference to military recruitment policies in other countries, particularly in continental Europe, the birthplace and classic home of the citizen army. Segal mentions the invention of the citizen army in Revolutionary France, but otherwise leaves the continent out of his account. This leads him to overestimate the importance of what he calls the "principle of obligation" in the American tradition. That principle, he argues, governed American military manpower policy from the colonial period up to the end of the nineteenth century. It is true that citizens were liable, in principle, for service in their state militias. In practice, however, as Segal himself points out, militia service was never even approximately universal. Exemptions, hired substitutes, and fines paid in lieu of service combined to undermine the principle of obligation. And around the turn of the century, even the principle was abandoned. The country resorted to conscription, to be sure, during the Civil War, the two World Wars, and between 1948 and 1973. But comparison with France, where military service has been a central obligation of

citizenship since the late nineteenth century, would have underscored the weakness of the principle of obligation in the American tradition, with its deeply voluntaristic and antistatist national self-understanding.

Even on the continent, to be sure, the historical moment of the mass citizen army and universal military service has passed, as Jacques van Doorn observed fifteen years ago. The extraordinary events of 1989 will only accelerate their decline. Even before the dramatic events of last fall, West Germany announced plans to reduce the size of its army. And in Switzerland, where universal military service and reserve duty until age fifty have been central to nationhood, more than a third of the electorate in a recent referendum voted to abolish the army. In this wider context, American attempts to revive the principle of obligatory service are bound to seem increasingly anachronistic. Hopes for rebuilding a sense of civic obligation will have to focus on other institutions than the military.

Values in the Marketplace: The American Stock Market Under Federal Securities Law, by JAMES BURK. Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988. 207 pp. \$34.95 cloth.

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Financial market regulation is designed to provide investors with information on investments' characteristics, prevent fraud and manipulation, assure that firms acting as agents are reasonably solvent and well managed, and encourage change in the organization of trading to enhance the efficiency of the system. The United States Securities and Exchange Commission is the principal federal regulator of the stock market. In *Values in the Marketplace*, James Burk discusses the origins and both the direct and indirect effects of federal securities regulation.

The common explanation of the origin of federal securities laws is that the economic crisis of the 1930s, coupled with the congressional investigations of speculative excesses, fraudulent sales, and market manipulation, produced pressures for reform. Close examination of the history, however, shows that the

timing of events does not support this simple model. Burk shows persuasively that the congressional investigations were important politically, but only as part of a series of events. Also critical were the larger electoral pressures associated with the depression, and almost random political and personal circumstances. The origin of the securities laws thus reflected larger class-based pressures, strains in the financial markets, and political and personal chance: "We are misled by a mechanistic model that begins with the moral laxity of financiers and proceeds through the crash and depression to government investigation and intervention" (p. 43).

The passage of the securities laws, in turn, led to changes in the social organization of beliefs about stock trading. Prior to the laws, the perceived value of stocks primarily reflected the value of physical property. Information about the property actually backing (or not backing) stock was a resource around which market activities revolved; manipulations generally involved taking advantage of information about the value of property. A major effect of the securities laws "was to undermine the social organization of trading based on [such] beliefs" by prohibiting manipulative stock trading and, critically, requiring that companies issuing stocks make periodic public reports about their financial conditions. The availability of information led to the emergence of a new role—the professional investment analyst—and eventually large brokerage firms, actors challenging an earlier structure "dominated by a few investment bankers and their stock operator associates" (p. 66). These consequences were not anticipated fully by backers of the securities laws, but were important.

Burk continues the theme of unintended but important consequences in discussing the development of institutional stock trading. The shift from individual to institutional investment has affected the markets dramatically in both economic terms (institutions are richer than individuals) and political terms (institutions are more formidable competitors in industry disputes). In the past, institutional trustees of estates were discouraged, even prohibited, from investing in stocks. Investment in stocks, as opposed to bonds, was considered speculative and more or less disreputable. Economic conditions battered these restrictions, however. Some presumably